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DELTA DYNAMICS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. 
EDWIN ARIOTO et aI., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Sales-Interpretation and Construction of Contract-As Buy 
and Sell Agreement.-In a manufacturer's action for breach 
of a combined distributorship and sales contract involving safe-
ty locks for firearms, the trial court correctly found that de-
fendant distributors' promise to sell a specified number of 
locks to third parties implied a promise to buy that number 
from plaintiff, where the distributors had agreed to buy the 
locks from plaintiff, the only source of supply. 
[2a.2b] Id.-Actions-Extrinsic Evidence to Aid. Vary, or Explain 
Oontract.-In a manufacturer's action for breach of a com-
bined distributorship and sales contract involving safety locks 
for tiI'earms, the trial court committed prejudicial error by ex-
cluding extr~sic evidence offered by defendant distributors to 
prove that the meaning of the termination clause of the con-
tract was to make plaintiff's right to terminate the contract 
its exclusive remedy for defendant distributors' failure to meet 
an annual sales quota, where the parties might have included 
the tennination clause to spell out with specificity the condi-
tion on which plaintiff manufacturer would be excused from 
further performance under the contract, or to set forth the 
. '~"'- exclusive remedy for a failure to meet the quota in any year, 
'\. or for both such purposes, where the clause was reasonably sus-
ceptible of meaning that it expressed the parties' determina-
tion that plaintiff's sole remedy for defendants' failure to meet 
a quota was to terminate the contract, and where there was 
nothing in the rest of the contract to preclude that interpre-
tation. 
[3] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid of Interpreta-
tion-Evidence of Meaning of Instrument.-The test of admis-
sibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a writ-
ten instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be 
plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered eyi-
dence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of 
the inRtrument is reaRonably susceptible. 
[4] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid of Interpretation-
Intention of Parlies.-In construing a contract, the court must 
consider all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 275 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 
§ 1069. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Sales, § 26; [2] Sales, § 212; [3] Evi-
dence, § 397; [4] Evidence, § 399; [5] Sales, § 305. 
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the parties to determine whether offered evidence is relevant 
to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is 
reasonably susceptible; and if the court decides, after consider-
ing such evidence, that the language of a contract, in the light 
of all the circumstances, is fairly susceptible of either one of 
the two interpretations contended for, extrinsic evidence to 
prove either of such meanings is admissible. 
[5] Sales-Seller's Remedies-Action for Damages.-Normally the 
breach of the distributors' promise in a purchase and distribu-
torship contract between a manufacturer and distributor to 
buy stated quotas of a product from the manufacturer would 
give rise to an action for damages, and a termination clause 
in the contract should be interpreted only as a statement of the 
condition on which the manufacturer could terminate the con-
tract and not to preclude the damage action, although suscepti-
ble of such meaning, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the 
contrary .. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County. Robert P. Sullivan, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for breach of a distributorship agreement. Judg-
ment for plaintiff reversed. 
Charles A. Zeller and Francis X. Vieira for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
Maxwell M. Freeman and Roger H. Bernhardt for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff Delta Dynamics, Inc. devel-
oped a trigger lock for use as a safety device on firearms. On 
March 23, 1961, it entered into a contract with defendants, 
partners doing business as the Pixey Distributing Co., for the 
distribution and sale of the locks throughout the United 
States. The contract was to run for five years from the date of 
the first delivery of the locks, and Pixey was given an option 
to renew the contract for another five years. Delta agreed to 
manufacture or arrange for the manufacture of the locks and 
to supply them to Pixey, which it appointed as exclusive dis-
tributor. Pixey agreed to pay for the locks at specified prices. 
Pixey promised to promote the locks diligently and "to sell 
not less than 50,000 units within one year from the date of 
delivery of the initial order" and not less than 100,000 units 
in each of the succeeding four years. "Should Pixey fail to 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev. Sales, § 129. 
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distribute in anyone year the minimum number of devices to 
be distributed by it ... this agreement shall be subject to 
termination" by Delta on 30 days' notice. The contract also 
provided that" In the event of breach of this agreement by 
either party, the party prevailing in any action for damages 
or enforcement of the terms of this Agreement shall be 
entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. " 
Pixey ordered and paid for 10,000 locks, and Delta deliv-
ered them in August 1961. In October 1961 Pixey executed a 
written purchase order requesting Delta to supply 10,000 
additional locks to be delivered "as needed." Pixey never 
requested delivery of that order, however, and it did not order 
any of the 30,000 additional locks needed to meet the 50,000 
quota for the first year. On October 1, 1962, Delta terminated 
the agreement. Thereafter it brought this action to recover 
damages for Pixey's failure to purchase the first year'8 
quota. 
After a nonjury trial the court entered judgment for Delta. 
It interpreted the contract as requiring Pixey to purchase 
50,000 locks in the first year, which commenced with the ini-
tial delivery of 10,000 locks, and rejected Pixey's defense that 
Delta's exclusive remedy for Pixey's failure to meet the 
quota was the right to terminate the contract. Pixey appeals. 
[1] We note at the outset that there is no merit in Pixey's 
"-. contention that it did not agree to buy 50,000 locks from 
. )Delta in the first year, but only to sell that number to third 
\parties. Since Pixey agreed to buy the locks from Delta, the 
only source of supply, its promise to sell 50,000 locks to third 
parties clearly implied a promise to buy that number from 
Delta, and the trial court correctly so found. 
[2a] Pixey contends, however, that the termination clause 
made Delta's right to terminate the contract Delta's exclusive 
remedy for Pixey's failure to meet the annual quota and that 
the trial court erred in refusing to admit extrinsic evidence 
offered to prove that the termination clause had that meaning. l 
IThe pretrial conference order stated that one of the issues to be 
decided was whether' 'the option given ... to the Plaintiff to terminate 
the distributorship for failure to sell 50,000 locks within one year [is] 
the exclusive remedy of the Plaintiff for said failure." At the trial 
counsel for defendants called one of his clients and asked, "During the 
negotiations that culminated in the execution of this contract between 
your company and Delta Dynamics, was there any conversation or dis-
cussion as to what would happen as far as Pixey Distributing Company 
is concerned if they failed to meet the minimum quota set up in that 
contraet' " Plaintiff'8 counsel objected that the question ealled for parol 
evidenee. Defendants' counsel answered that" The contract is ambiguous 
) 
) 
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[3) •• The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to 
explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it 
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, 
but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a mean-
ing to which the language of the instrument. is reasonably 
susceptible." {4) To determine whether offered evidence is 
relevant to prove such a meaning the court must consider all 
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties. 
"If the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the 
language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances, 
• is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations 
contended for .. .' [citations], extrinsic evidence to provc 
either of such meanings is admissible." (Pacific Gas & Elec. 
00. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. 00. (1968) ante, pp. 33, 
40 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561,442 P.2d 641].) 
[2b) In ~he present case the parties may have included the 
termination clause to spell out with specificity the condition 
on which Delta would be excused from further performance 
under the contract, or to set forth the exclusive remedy for a 
failure to meet the quota in any year, or for both sllch pur-
poses. That clause is therefore reasonably susceptible of the 
meaning contended for by Pixey, namely, that it expresses the 
parties' determination that Delta's sole remedy for Pixey's 
failure to meet a quota was to terminate the contract. There is 
nothing in the rest of the contract to preclude that interpreta-
tion. It does not render meaningless the provision for the 
recovery of attorneys' fees in the event of an action for 
damages for breach of the contract, for the attorneys' fees 
provision would still have full effect with respect to otller 
breaches of the contract.2 Accordingly, the trial court com-
and we are trying to elicit from the testimony of varioDS witnesses what 
the intentions of the parties were." The objection was sustained. The 
offer of proof, taken alone, was too general to provide a ground for 
appeal. (Stickel v. San Diego Elec. By. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 157, 162·164 
[195 P.2d 416]; Douillard V. Woodd (1942) 20 Cal.2d 665, 670 [128 P.2d 
6]; see Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) In the context of this trial, how· 
eyer, where, liS the pretrial conference order demonstrates, one of the 
Ilrimary issues was whether the contract permitted recovery of damages 
for the failure to meet a quota, it was obvious that counsel expected his 
witness to answer that the parties intended termination to be an exclusive 
remedy. Thus the SUbstance, purpose, and relevance of the offered evi· 
dence was made known to the court, and no more complete offer of proof 
was required. (People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 242 [187 P.2d 
706] ; People v. D1UJne (1942) 21 Cal.2d 71, 81 [ISO P.2d 123]; see Evid. 
Code, § 354, subd. (a).) 
2For example, Pixey might llave breached the contract by failing 
diligently to promote the locks or by not paying for locks that had been 
deli, ered. Delta might also have breached the contract in various ways. 
j 
i 
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mitted prejudicial error by excluding extrinsic evidence 
offered to prove the meaning of the termination clause con-
tended for by Pixey. The judgment must therefore be 
reversed. 
[5] Invoking Newby v. Anderson (1950) 36 Cal.2d 463 
[224 P.2d 673], Pixey contends that for the guidance of the 
trial court on retrial we should hold that in the absence of 
extrinsic evidence offered to prove a different meaning of the 
contract, termination is Delta's sole remedy for Pixey's fail-
ure to meet a quotn. In thc Newby case the national distri-
butor of a product caned "Aquella" had appointed Newby 
its western distributor. The national distributor was not satis-
fied with Newby's performance and transferred the distri-
butorship to the Andersons. To effectuate the transfer, the 
Andersons signed a distributorship agreement with the na-
tional distributor and a royalty agreement with Newby. The 
distributorship agreement provided that" 'in order to retain 
exclusive distribution "The Andersons" must purchase 
.400,000 gallons of Aquella per annum' " and that" 'It is 
agreed that "The Andersons" shall diligently ... prosecute 
the sale of ~quella throughout the entire territory, and do all 
things reasonably necessary to establish the sale of Aquella in 
all trade centers ... .''' (Newby v. Anderson, supra, 36 
Ca1.2d 463, 465.) Later the national distributor terminated 
the Andersons' western distributorship because the Ander-
~ns did not sell the quota, and Newby brought an action 
against the Andersons under the royalty agreement. We held 
that the national distributor's sole remedy for the Ander-
sons' failure to meet the quota was to terminate t11e agree-
ment. The Andersons had only promised, however, diligently 
to prosecute the sale of Aquella, and had undertaken "no 
obligation to purchase the minimum quota of Aquella." 
(Newby v. Anderson, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 463, 469.) Likewise, 
they had undertaken no obligation to sell the minimum quota 
to third parties. Under those circumstances, the purchase (If 
400,000 gallons was only a condition for retaining the distri-
butorship. That condition did not embody a promise for the 
breach of which an action for damages would lie. In the 
present case, however, as noted above. Pixey promised to buy 
the stated quotas from Delta. Normally the breach of such a 
promise would give rise to an action for damages. Although 
the termination clause is reasonably susceptible of a meaning 
that precludes that remedy in the absence of extrinsic evi-
dence, we believe it should not be given that meaning but 
'I ., 
". 
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should be interpreted only as a statement of the condition on 
which Delta could terminate the contract. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J. ,Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
Both on the basis of the four corners of the contraet and 
the context in which the interrogation proceeded, the trial 
court properly excluded parol evidenee. 
Defendant's counsel, in direct examination of his own wit-
ness, asked: "All right now, Mr. Hoffman. During the nego-
tiations that culminated in the execution of this contract 
between your company and Delta Dynamics, was there any 
conversation or discussion as to what would happen as far as 
Pixey Distributing Company is concerned if they failed to 
meet the minimum quota set up in that eontract Y" (Italics 
added.) 
An objection was made by plaintiff's counsel and sustained 
by the court. Defense counsel neither made an offer of proof 
nor any further effort to demonstrate there was an ambiguity 
in the contract, or if there was, to offer an explanation. 
On that frail record of a fleeting and demonstrably im-
proper single question, the majority reverse a judgment to 
which the trier of fact found plaintiff clearly entitled on the 
weight of the evidence. 
It is hornbook law that conversations, discussions and nego-
tiations culminating in a written instrument are not admissi-
ble in evidence. Indeed, since 1872 Civil Code section 1625 
(amended in 1905), has provided that the "execution of a 
contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written 
or not, supet'sedes all the negotiations or stipulations concern-
ing its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution 
ofthe instrument." (Italics added.) 
'Vhether or not defendant's counsel intended to limit his 
C}Uf'ry to negotiat.ions preceding execution of the contract, the 
unalterable fact is t.hat he did so. He asked no furt.her ques-
tions and made no offer of proof. His efforts on t.his appeal, 
and t.hose of the majorit.y of this eourt, to expand his inquiry 
beyond the subject of negotiations are an attempt to rewrite 
the record. 
The majodty hold that an offer of proof was unnecessary 
because the pretrial conference demonstrated" counsel expect-
ed his witness to answer that the parties intended termination 
) 
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to be an exclusive remedy." This is pure legal legerdemain, 
for while tIle purpose of the pretrial proceeding is to detrr-
mine the issues to be tried (Van Alstyne & Grossman. Cali-
fornia Pretrial and Settlement Supplement (Cont. Ed. Bar 
1967) § 3.30), it has always bcen understood that "the par-
ties' contentions on those issues are generally regarded as 
merely tentative, nonbinding descriptions of what the parties 
hope to prove" (id., § 10.14). No authority holds or has 
hinted that a pretrial discussion or order is a substitute for an 
offer of proof at the trial. 
As stated in Ransom v. Ransom (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 258. 
264 [30 Cal.Rptr. 53]: "It is a recognized rule that: 'Ordi-
narily when the ruling of the court sustaining an objection 
indicates that counsel may not make further inquiry of a 
similar nature, he must then make an offer of proof. For 
example, if an objection is sustained to a question which on 
its face does not indicate its materiality, counsel asking the 
question must show the materiality of the question and the 
expected answer. If counsel fails to make the required offer of 
proof, he is precluded from urging the exclusionary ruling as 
error on appeal. [Citation.] The requirement of the offer of 
proof serves two practical purposes.' First, it permits thc trial 
court to reconsider and correct an erroneous exclusionary 
ruling in the light of all the facts. Second, it permits thc 
appellate court to determine if the ruling was erroneous and, 
if so, whether it was sufficiently prejudicial to justify a 
reversal of the judgment.' (California Civil Procedure Dur-
ing Trial (Cont.Ed. Bar 1960) § 13.26.) " 
Not only did counsel fail to make an offer of proof, his 
query was obviously faulty. As Justice Gargano wrote for a 
unanimous Court of Appeal in this case (65 Cal.Rptr. 61G, 
622), "[I]t is evident from counsel's question that he was not 
attempting to lay a foundation to show a latent ambiguity, 
nor was he attempting to prove that the words used in the 
contract were used in some special or technical sense. To the 
contrary, counsel's question was seemingly an attempt to 
change, vary or add to the terms of the agreement. Hence thc 
trial court properly sustained the objection. " 
Once again this court adopts a course leading toward emas-
culation of the parol evidence rule. During this very yf'at· 
Masterson v. Sine (1968) 68 Cal.2d 222 [65 Cal.Rptr. 545, 
436 P.2d 561], and Pacific Gas &; Elec. Co. v. O. W. ThomaR 
Drayage etc. Co. (1968) ante, p. 33 [69 Cal.Rptr. 
561, 442 P.2d 641], have contributed toward that result. AI-
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though I had misgivings at the time, I must confess to joining 
the majority in both of those cases. Now, however, that the 
majority deem negotiations leading to execution of contracts 
admissible, the trend has become so unmistakably ominous 
that I must urge a halt. 
It can be contended that there may be no evil per se in 
considering testimony about every discussion and conversation 
prior to and contemporaneous with the signing of a written 
instrument and that social utility may result in some circum-
stances. The problem, however, is that which devolves upon 
members of the bar who are commissioned by clients to pre-
pare a written instrument able to withstand future assaults. 
Given two experienced businessmen dealing at arm's length, 
both represented by competent counsel, it has become virtu-
ally impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to 
draft a written contract that will produce predictable results 
in court. The written word, heretofore deemed immutable, is 
now at all times subject to alteration by self-serving recitals 
based upon fading memories of antecedent events. This, I sub-
mit, is a serious impediment to the certainty required in 
commercial transactions. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1968. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were. of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
